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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WORKING WELL(NESS): THE IMPACT OF THE ADA FINAL RULE
ON WELLNESS PROGRAM REGULATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR
A ZERO-INCENTIVE RULE

ABSTRACT
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently amended
wellness program regulation under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). Amidst criticism of the new rule, this article proposes
the EEOC return to a zero-incentive policy for voluntary wellness programs that
include disability-related inquiries or medical examinations. First, it reviews
existing literature on wellness programs and the ADA, highlighting the legal
and ethical challenges facing American workers with disabilities. Then, it
explores the latest case law, illustrating the effects of the new rule compared to
the proposal. By eliminating the thirty percent incentive limit and redefining
“voluntary” to disallow all financial incentives and penalties, the EEOC would
best realize the ADA’s goal to protect workers from harmful cost shifting and
from being compelled to give employers disability-related information that
could lead to workplace discrimination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
issued a final rule, which took effect January 2017, regulating employee
wellness programs under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 1
The rule responds to conflicting legal and policy regulations regarding wellness
programs. 2 The final rule reflects the EEOC’s intention to harmonize ADA
regulations with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 3 The rule
defines “voluntary wellness programs,” identifies permissible incentives, and
provides interpretive guidance for structuring non-discriminatory wellness
programs. 4 Yet its attempt to resolve some regulative issues has sparked new
issues of contention among wellness program proponents and critics alike.
In this paper, I propose the EEOC return to a zero-incentive policy for
voluntary wellness programs that includes disability-related inquiries or medical
examinations. I argue that despite their popularity, wellness programs have not
produced results warranting abridgment of longstanding ADA protections, nor
should those protections be sacrificed for the supposed benefit of other laws,
including the politically jeopardized ACA. The ADA stands on its own, and its
rules should be in the best interests of its own legislative aims.
Section II contextualizes wellness programs by summarizing recent trends
among programs in the United States. Section II also considers the known merits
of wellness programs and the relationship between the legal and policy goals of
promoting wellness programs. Section II continues with an introduction to the
existing literature on the interaction between wellness programs and the ADA—
discussing ongoing ethical and legal conflicts, including the clash between the
narrative of personal responsibility and the reality of disability discrimination in
the workplace. This section also examines comments the EEOC received on the
proposed final rule in its preliminary stages. Turning to litigation, I direct the
reader to several key cases illustrating the development of judicial interpretation
of how wellness programs function under the ADA, focusing primarily on the
definition of “voluntary” and the insurance safe harbor provision in EEOC v.
Flambeau, Inc. and EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc.
Section III discusses recent litigation to illustrate the ways in which the final
rule does and does not address previously identified concerns about the legal

1. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,126 (May
17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
2. Id.
3. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC Issues Final Rules on Employer
Wellness Programs (May 16, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-16-16.cfm
(last visited July 31, 2017).
4. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) (2016).
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conflicts between wellness program promotion and the ADA, analyzing the
repercussions of both the final rule and the proposed zero-incentive rule in
Flambeau, Orion, and AARP v. EEOC. The final rule has injected a new legal
problem for voluntariness under the ADA on which courts have yet to reach
consensus, though these cases show that courts are giving deference to the
EEOC’s compromise-driven explanation for the digression from its previous
interpretation. The recommendation put forth in this paper is for the EEOC to
amend 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) by removing the thirty percent incentive
limit and redefining “voluntary” health programs involving disability-related
inquiries or medical examinations as programs in which an employer may
neither require participation nor penalize employees who do not participate. A
zero-incentive rule best encapsulates the legislative intent to protect workers
from discrimination based on disability.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

A Brief Introduction to Wellness Programs

Wellness programs are a booming industry among large employers, and
today most programs are tied to employer-sponsored health insurance plans. 5
Employers offer a wide range of wellness programs—from gift card raffles for
weight loss and incentives for wearing FitBits to smoking cessation programs
and reduced insurance premiums. 6 The two main types of programs are
participatory and health-contingent, the latter of which requires employees to hit
certain health benchmarks to earn rewards (or accrue penalties if benchmarks
are not reached). 7 Both programs, but particularly health-contingent programs,
may require employees to divulge medical information by completing health
risk assessments (HRAs)—for which employees answer questions about their
health, including “medical history, health status, and lifestyle”—as well as
undergoing biometric screenings—for which employees are examined by a
health care professional and data is collected from blood work and other medical

5. See Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of
Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 299–300
(2012).
6. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH, RESEARCH & EDU. TR., Employer Health Benefits
Survey 2016 Summary of Findings 8 (2016), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2016/09/employer-health-benefits-2016-summary-of-findings.pdf [hereinafter KFF & HRET]
(presenting data for employer-sponsored health benefits in 2016 as collected by the Kaiser Family
Foundation and the Health Research & Educational Trust in their annual survey of employersponsored health benefits among private and nonfederal public employers with three or more
workers).
7. Emily Koruda, Note, More Carrot, Less Stick: Workplace Wellness Programs & the
Discriminatory Impact of Financial and Health-Based Incentives, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 131,
138 (2016).
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tests on their risk factors, such as “body weight, cholesterol, blood pressure,
stress, and nutrition.” 8 This data is then used to evaluate a given employee’s
health risks. 9 Among employers offering some form of a wellness program in
2016, over half of large firms (employing 200 or more workers) incorporate
HRAs and biometric screenings. 10 Because large firms comprise over half of
U.S. employment, the programs selected by those firms may affect large
numbers of workers. 11 Once the data is obtained, employees may have to meet
certain health benchmarks—such as quitting smoking or improving cholesterol
levels—as part of their participation in the wellness program. 12
The number of wellness programs in the United States has risen dramatically
in the twenty-first century. 13 While wellness programs are making headlines,
such as with the proliferation of wearable fitness trackers, 14 the 2016 Kaiser
Family Foundation’s (KFF’s) eighteenth annual Employer Health Benefits
Survey indicates the upward trend may be ebbing. 15 Since 1979, the federal
government has encouraged employers to promote wellness at work. 16 By the
late 1990s, approximately half of employees reported being offered wellness
programs. 17 Jumping forward with the KFF annual survey, the number of large
employers offering wellness programs surged to eighty-two percent in 2008 and
peaked at ninety-nine percent in 2013. 18 The spike in the number of wellness
programs was “likely due to expectations that they would improve employee
health and productivity and reduce health care costs.” 19 Indeed, employers
generally implement wellness programs for two broad purposes: (1) cost savings

8. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 7.
9. Kristin Madison, Employer Wellness Incentives, the ACA, and the ADA: Reconciling
Policy Objectives, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407, 413 (2015).
10. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 7 ex. J.
11. Madison, supra note 9, at 413.
12. Koruda, supra note 7, at 138–39.
13. E. Pierce Blue, Wellness Programs, the ADA, and GINA: Framing the Conflict, 31
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 369 (2014).
14. FITBIT, FitBit Group Health, www.fitbit.com/group-health (last visited July 9, 2017).
15. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 7 (reporting that eighty-three percent of large employers
in 2016 offered at least one wellness program); KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH &
TR., Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey 2014 200 ex. 12.2 (2014), https://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/8625-employer-health-benefits-2014-annual-survey6.pdf
[hereinafter KFF & HRET, Survey 2014] (reporting that ninety-eight percent of large employers in
2014 offered at least one wellness program); KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & TR.,
Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey 2013 184 ex. 12.2 (2013), files.kff.org/attachment/fullreport-ehbs-2013-abstract [hereinafter KFF & HRET, Survey 2013] (reporting that ninety-nine
percent of large employers in 2013 offered at least one wellness program).
16. Madison, supra note 9, at 412.
17. Blue, supra note 13, at 370.
18. Id.
19. Haijing Huang et al., Incentives, Program Configuration, and Employee Uptake of
Workplace Wellness Programs, 58 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV. MED. 30, 30 (2016).
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and (2) improved employee health. 20 The rationale for focusing on employee
health is to reduce health care insurance costs for the employer as well as reduce
employee absenteeism and increase productivity. 21 The saturated market for
wellness programs in 2013 tapered off slightly to ninety-eight percent in 2014,
and the most recent 2016 data reports only eighty-three percent of large
employers have wellness programs. 22 Wellness programs are certainly not going
to disappear in the next decade, but it is possible that unsuccessful cost saving—
both in research studies and in practice—has contributed to the slight decline in
the last two years.
B.

The Effectiveness of Wellness Programs at Saving Money and Improving
Health

In order to recommend a rule that would make certain wellness programs
unlawful, it is useful to consider the existing research on the effectiveness of
such programs on the two goals mentioned above: saving money and improving
health. If a policy of bargaining away core protections of the ADA is to be
supportable, then wellness programs’ cost savings and health improvement
ought to be measurable and provable. While the industry marketers of wellness
programs promise results, 23 there is a lack of credible scholarship on wellness
program performance—and those studies performed do not find that wellness
programs are having the desired impact on either of the two goals of cost savings
or health improvement. 24
One problem with measuring savings from wellness programs is the manner
in which premiums are counted. 25 Insurance companies continue to charge
higher and higher premiums, and, as a result, employers adopt health plans that
cost-shift to employees. 26 For wellness programs tied to insurance plans, an
employer may think it has achieved overall cost savings when its own premium
costs to the insurance company are reduced; often, however, the insurance
company actually raises the total premiums and cost-shifts the difference to the
employees. 27 Other ways an employer may misperceive total savings when
adopting a wellness program are by reducing benefits or increasing deductibles,
both of which allow the employer to reduce its out-of-pocket premium costs to

20. Mariner, supra note 5, at 300.
21. Id.
22. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 8; KFF & HRET, Survey 2014, supra note 15, at 200 ex.
12.2; KFF & HRET, Survey 2013, supra note 15, at 184 ex. 12.2.
23. Madison, supra note 9, at 413.
24. E. Pierce Blue, Attorney-Advisor to EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum, Invited Speaker
at Saint Louis University School of Law: Employee Wellness Plans and the ADA: How Does the
ADA Apply? (Oct. 25, 2016) (on file with Saint Louis University School of Law).
25. Mariner, supra note 5, at 309.
26. Koruda, supra note 7, at 139.
27. Madison, supra note 9, at 414.
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the detriment of the employee. 28 The main issue is that the employer pays less
in premiums than it did before the wellness program, the employees who
participate in the program may pay the same as before or slightly less depending
on the incentive, and the insurance company receives higher premiums. Such a
scenario is not a reduction in total health care costs, which is what wellness
programs are often marketed to accomplish and which skirts close to the kind of
program the EEOC specifically denounces in § 1630.14(d)(1): to meet the
requirement of “reasonably designed,” a wellness program must have “a
reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in
participating employees,” and “[a] program also is not reasonably designed if it
exists mainly to shift costs from the covered entity to targeted employees based
on their health.” 29 Wellness program leaders tell employers that wellness
programs bring savings—both to the employer and to the employees. 30 Despite
numerous “examples in the literature of companies that say they saved money
in wellness . . . the results are never plausibility-tested.” 31 Moreover, the ones
most burdened are those employees who do not want to share their health
information and thus opt out of the wellness programs, ultimately paying large
financial penalties. Individuals with disabilities or chronic illnesses, “who are
more vulnerable to health disparities . . . [and are] already wracked with medical
expenses, can feel coerced to participate in wellness programs . . . [and] are less
able to attain employer-designated health benchmarks because of inherent health
disparities.” 32
A 2015 Research and Development (RAND) Corporation study about
employee uptake in wellness programs contributed to the growing body of
research showing a lack of cost savings achieved by wellness programs. 33 Such
studies are important background for legal policy decisions, especially given that
“the heated debate is carried out with little empirical evidence on whether
incentives are actually effective in increasing employee participation, let alone

28. See id.; see also Barry Hall, Health Incentives: The Science and Art of Motivating Healthy
Behaviors, BENEFITS Q., 2nd Quarter 2008, at 20–21 (rationalizing the disparate cost shifting by
conceiving of health promotion itself as the employees’ quantifiable gain).
29. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(1) (2016).
30. Madison, supra note 9, at 413.
31. AL LEWIS, WHY NOBODY BELIEVES THE NUMBERS: DISTINGUISHING FACT FROM
FICTION IN POPULATION HEALTH MANAGEMENT 128 (2012).
32. Koruda, supra note 7, at 139.
33. Kandice A. Kapinos et al., Does Targeting Higher Health Risk Employees or Increasing
Intervention Intensity Yield Savings in a Workplace Wellness Program? 57 J. OCCUPATIONAL &
ENV. MED. 1257, 1261 (2015) (finding that data from a preventive-oriented wellness program
collected between 2003 and 2011 showed no cost savings for those employees targeted for chronic
risks while active lifestyle management participation showed a modest twenty dollar savings based
on less expensive outpatient visits).
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improving health outcomes and reducing cost.” 34 The 2015 employee uptake
study involved employers seeking to increase employee participation rates in
wellness programs, which is highly relevant to the EEOC’s argument that
wellness programs can only be effective if they actually acquire all the
employees’ data. 35 Scholars note that “[e]mployers appear to be more
enthusiastic about health promotion than employees.” 36 Without the employees
incentivized to provide their data, the programs cannot accurately target areas in
need of risk management among the pool of employees. 37 Thus, it is not
surprising that increased financial incentives showed a twenty-three percent
increase in employee participation in the wellness program. 38
When measuring the success of a wellness program, researchers should look
beyond economic and health indicators: “Successful implementation can be
difficult and should be weighed against the actual return on investment,
considered along with not only the legal costs but also the potential effects for
discrimination.” 39 That is, even if a wellness program provably cuts costs and
improves health, it would still be undesirable if it results in potential
discrimination. 40 It is not an acceptable trade to exchange protections against
discrimination with monetary gains and “wellness,” a term that the next section
explains carries normative connotations in the context of discrimination on the
basis of a disability.
C. The History of Wellness Programs and the ADA: Identifying Ethical and
Legal Conflicts
The ADA regulates employers’ access to employee medical information in
order to protect workers from being discriminated against on the basis of a
disability. 41 The ADA limits the extent to which employers may use incentives
to encourage employees to participate in wellness programs that ask them to
respond to disability-related inquiries or undergo medical examinations:

34. Huang, supra note 19, at 30.
35. Blue, supra note 13, at 382.
36. Mariner, supra note 5, at 300.
37. Blue, supra note 13, at 382.
38. Huang, supra note 19, at 33.
39. Carrie Griffin Basas, What’s Bad About Wellness? What the Disability Rights Perspective
Offers About the Limitations of Wellness, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1035, 1045 (2014).
40. See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT
98 (2013) (explaining that “[a]dditionally, reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities
(e.g., offering classes at accessible, ADA-compliant sites and providing informational material in
plain language and alternate formats, such as large print) are important to ensure accessibility;
however, case study employers did not discuss tailoring wellness programs to the needs of people
with disabilities”).
41. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (d)(1) (2012); Blue, supra note
13, at 374.
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A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make
medical inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual
with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 42

The ADA permits three exceptions to when an employer can acquire medical
information from its employees: (1) when inquiries are job-related and
consistent with business necessity, (2) when inquiries pertain to the employee’s
ability to perform job-related functions, and (3) when inquiries are a voluntary
component of an employer-sponsored wellness program. 43 Thus, wellness
programs are expressly provided for by the ADA. However, the legal definition
of “voluntary” under the ADA has become extremely contentious in its new
form in the final rule. 44
Another key aspect of wellness programs covered by the ADA is reasonable
accommodation. If a person with a disability cannot participate in an activity or
attain a certain benchmark, the program must offer an alternate activity or
standard the individual is able to meet. 45 For example, if a wellness program
offers a reward for walking a certain amount, an individual who cannot walk
must be given the opportunity to do an alternate fitness activity; similarly, if a
wellness program penalizes employees who fail to achieve a goal of a specific
low cholesterol level, and an individual is unable to do so due to a chronic
medical condition or other disability, then some alternative goal must be set that
is reasonably tailored to that individual’s needs. 46 “Reasonable alternative
standards do not need to be anticipated or crafted in advance; they can be created
as the need arises, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the
employee’s limitations and the ‘reasonable design’ of the program itself.” 47 The
legislative intent is “to ensure equal access to benefits.” 48
The entitlement to reasonable accommodation under the ADA is challenging
in the arena of wellness programs, where health is framed as a personal
responsibility with financial consequences for failure to meet certain norms in
the workplace. The very idea that wellness is attainable through quantitative
biometrics or pure autonomous effort “construct[s] an image that further
marginalizes people with disabilities.” 49 Courts also tend to define wellness
under the same framework of personal and economic responsibility “based on a
theory that ‘encouraging employees to get involved in their own healthcare leads
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
Blue, supra note 13, at 376.
See id.
Id. at 377; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(5)(A).
Blue, supra note 13, at 377.
Basas, supra note 39, at 1042 (internal citations omitted).
Blue, supra note 13, at 377.
Basas, supra note 39, at 1062.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

WORKING WELL(NESS)

217

to a more healthy population that costs less to insure.’” 50 From an ethical
standpoint, scholars—including Wendy Mariner, Carrie Griffin Basas, and Peter
Conrad—have cautioned against viewing health status as a personal failing for
which to be financially and socially penalized. 51 Rather, it has been espoused
that “[d]isability rights recognizes that some people will, in fact, never be
healthy or vigorous and that the best efforts are spent not on trying to change the
impossible but in removing the social and economic barriers that stigmatize
illness.” 52 Mariner commented that “[d]iscrimination on the basis of health
factors may be as irrational as discrimination on the basis of disability.” 53 There
is a fear that introducing risk classification to employee wellness can harm
Americans with disabilities by creating a social norm of health such that any
deviancy is an individual failing. 54 This notion “reflect[s] increasing levels of
deservedness for health or illness…fram[ing] disability as the problem or the
undesirable difference, rather than see[ing] it as a neutral state of being,” 55 which
can lead to discrimination. Furthermore, framing health as a personal
responsibility is incorporated into the ACA, “which is inconsistent with [the
ACA’s] overall goal of universal access to health care.” 56 If the ACA aimed to
remove classifications such that everyone could get access to health care, it is
contradictory to simultaneously invite employers to pay and penalize employees
based on health risk classifications. 57 In this way, support of corporate
participatory wellness programs by the Tri-Agency—comprised of the
departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury—is
“incompatible with” the ADA, which banned employers from requiring
employees to provide health information before wellness programs were
adopted into the statutory language as an exception. 58 Wellness program
promotion thus “reinforces the pre-ADA fear that employees with disabilities
place ever-expanding burdens on the budget because of accommodation and
health care costs.” 59

50. Id. at 1038 (quoting Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011),
aff’d sub nom. Seff v. Broward Cty., Fla., 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012)).
51. Mariner, supra note 5, at 330–31; Basas, supra note 39, at 1054–55; Peter Conrad,
Wellness in the Work Place: Potentials and Pitfalls of Work-Site Health Promotion, 65 MILBANK
Q. 255, 267–68 (1987).
52. Basas, supra note 39, at 1054.
53. Mariner, supra note 5, at 324.
54. See id.
55. Basas, supra note 39, at 1051 (emphasis added).
56. Mariner, supra note 5, at 330.
57. See id. at 328.
58. Jennifer Pomeranz, Participatory Workplace Wellness Programs: Reward, Penalty, and
Regulatory Conflict, 93 MILBANK Q. 301, 302–03 (2015) (arguing pre-final rule that new federal
law is needed to protect the ADA).
59. Basas, supra note 39, at 1057.
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D. Comments to the EEOC’s Proposed Final Rule
Shifting from a review of the scholarly literature to recent organizationbased approaches, the EEOC received over 300 comments to its proposed rule
on the government regulations website and 2750 comments overall from a wide
range of organizations and individuals: some offering support and others raising
concerns. 60 The Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) and the
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF) criticized the proposed
rule for not placing sufficient limits on wellness program medical inquiries to
protect workers with disabilities. 61 The proposed rule adopted a version of the
thirty percent financial penalty limit found in HIPAA and the ACA. 62 As an
alternative to limiting insurance premium penalties, the CCD and DREDF
suggested waiving penalties as reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 63
Rather than financially penalizing individuals with disabilities who opt not to
complete HRAs or biometric screenings, the EEOC would direct employers to
waive the penalty so workers with disabilities would not be denied equal
opportunities for incentives.
The EEOC’s allowance for penalties also led the CCD and DREDF to
disagree with the EEOC’s definition of “voluntary.” 64 For fifteen years prior to
the proposed rule, the EEOC defined “voluntary” under the ADA “to mean that
an employer may neither require participation nor penalize employees who do
not participate.” 65 The transition to permitting penalties for non-participation
was the EEOC’s concession to the penalty limits in the ACA. The CCD and
DREDF urge that the ADA and the ACA may coexist and that the ADA does
not need to loosen protections for workers with disabilities by “importing” ACA
penalties. 66 Rather, the EEOC should retain the original “voluntary”

60. Regulations under the Americans with Disabilities Act; Amendments, REGULATIONS.GOV
(Jun. 19, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EEOC-2015-0006-0001 (last visited
July 9, 2017); Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,129
(proposed May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
61. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, Comments on Proposed Rule, Amendments to
Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, RIN 3046-AB01 1 (June 19, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EEOC-2015-0006-0303 (last visited July 9, 2017);
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Comments on Proposed Rule, Amendments to
Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, RIN 3046–AB01 18 (June 19, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EEOC-2015-0006-0318 (last visited July 9, 2017).
62. Amendments to Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,659, 21,662 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
63. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 16; Disability Rights
Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 18.
64. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 3–4; Disability Rights
Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 3.
65. Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 3–4.
66. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 9; Disability Rights Education
& Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 7–8.
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interpretation in which non-job-related medical examinations and inquiries
cannot require participation or impose penalties for non-participation. 67 The
CCD and DREDF argue the proposed rule’s definition of “voluntary” presents
a “Hobson’s choice” in which workers seeking to protect themselves under the
ADA must choose between burdensome financial penalties and relinquishing “a
core protection of the ADA” to be free from disability-related medical inquiries
in the workplace. 68 If the penalties are too high, the choice becomes coercive
and effectively not a choice. Considering the numbers in perspective, the KFF
2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey found the average annual individual
insurance premium was $6435, and thirty percent of that is over $1900 in
potential penalties each year for not completing a required HRA or biometric
screening. 69 The CCD notes there is essentially a double penalty because in
addition to the thousands of dollars in penalties a worker may owe, the same
worker would also be denied savings from employer contributions, which are as
high as twenty to thirty percent of the costs for workers participating in the
wellness program as part of the employer benefits plan for eighty-five percent
of employers. 70 This shifts a non-nominal burden onto those who need the most
financial assistance: low-income workers with disabilities. Indeed, the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions reports that in 2014
American workers with disabilities comprised a large percentage of workers in
poverty. 71 The principal author of the 2013 federal government RAND study on
employer wellness programs wrote, “We should not penalize vulnerable
employees reluctant to join marginally effective programs.” 72 Thus, while it is
laudable for the EEOC to aim for a system of rewards and penalties large enough
to incentivize but not so large as to render employer-provided health plans
unaffordable, the CCD and DREDF calculate the proposed rule would not serve
that goal, because it would result in penalties and lost incentives to those least
able to shoulder the burden. 73 A fairer system, the organizations argue, would
be (1) to prohibit financial penalties and (2) to ensure financial incentives are
offered to all workers regardless of whether they provide answers to medical
67. Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 11–12.
68. Id. at 4, 12; Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 3, 10.
69. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 1–2 (noting workers on average contribute eighteen percent
of the premium for single coverage).
70. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 5.
71. S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 113TH CONG., FULFILLING THE
PROMISE: OVERCOMING THE PERSISTENT BARRIERS TO ECON. SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2014); see also BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, INCOME & POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 13 tbl. 3, 16 (2016),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf
(finding in 2014 that over four million people with disabilities were in poverty, comprising 17.9%
of all people in poverty between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four).
72. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 15–16.
73. See id. at 16; Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 2.
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inquiries. 74 In this way, workers with disabilities would not be denied incentives
because of their disabilities.
In sum, wellness programs are not leaving the workplace just yet. There is
bipartisan support for wellness programs: the personal responsibility for one’s
health appeals to conservative policies, 75 while the focus on preventive health
models for the American worker appeals to liberal policies. Yet studies show
that the cost savings and health benefits are not as viable as advertised by
wellness plan promoters. 76 Shuffled money and disguised cost shifting leave
vulnerable employees with disabilities unable to opt out and thus bearing the
greatest cost when they are the least likely to benefit from the health metric
requirements.
E.

EEOC Litigation on the Safe Harbor Provision

Turning from public comments to the judicial arena, courts have interpreted
wellness program compliance with the ADA in a way that is inconsistent with
the final rule. To set the stage, the EEOC has litigated ADA and wellness
program conflicts once in the Eleventh Circuit and twice in the Seventh Circuit
with mixed results. 77 The conflicts arose with respect to whether the insurance
safe harbor provision of 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) applies to employer wellness
programs. 78 Although “[w]ellness programs are not traditionally associated with
basic risk underwriting,” employers have nonetheless argued the insurance safe
harbor provision insulates their programs that are tied to health insurance plans
from discrimination claims. 79 The original reasoning for having a safe harbor
was “to allow premium differences that are based on actuarial differences in
claims costs,” rather than on “some independent desire for a healthy
workforce.” 80 In the final rule, the EEOC asserts the safe harbor provision does
not apply to wellness programs. 81 Before the final rule was issued, the courts

74. Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 11–12.
75. See A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE 2, abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-HealthCare-Snapshot.pdf (“Rather
than tie up wellness programs in red tape, our plan makes sure employers are able to reward
employees for making healthy choices. This will encourage personal responsibility, and save both
businesses and workers valuable health care dollars.”).
76. Kapinos, supra note 33, at 1261.
77. Seff v. Broward Cty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846
F.3d 941, 941 (7th Cir. 2017); EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 989 (E.D.
Wis. 2016).
78. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1222; Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d at 944; Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F.
Supp. 3d at 992.
79. Blue, supra note 13, at 379.
80. Mariner, supra note 5, at 319–20.
81. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (2016) (“The ‘safe harbor’ provisions in § 1630.16(f)
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held otherwise in Seff v. Broward County and on summary judgment in EEOC
v. Flambeau, Inc. 82
In Flambeau, the district court held that requiring participation in a wellness
plan was a condition precedent for being on the employer insurance plan, and
that this constituted a “term” of the insurance plan; hence the safe harbor rule
applied. 83 In that case, the employer’s wellness program required an HRA and
biometric screening as well as other health promotion activities like weight loss
competitions and healthy vending machines. 84 The EEOC argued that 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) prohibited a covered entity from requiring a medical
examination unless shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 85 The EEOC also argued that applying the insurance safe harbor to
employer wellness plans would render its rules for wellness programs
ineffective. 86 The court, however, held the safe harbor applied because use of
the HRA results to make decisions “fundamental . . . [to] developing and
administering an insurance plan,” comprised a “term” under the benefit plan. 87
The court believed this would not render the EEOC rule ineffective because not
all wellness programs are tied to insurance plans. 88 This district court case was
decided before the EEOC issued its final rule.
In the wake of the unfavorable rulings in Seff and Flambeau, the EEOC took
a strong stance on the inapplicability of the safe harbor provision to wellness
programs in the interpretive guidance section of the final rule. 89 Overly
expansive applications of the provision, the EEOC cautioned, would justify any
medical inquiry posed to a worker as part of a health plan “if there is some
possibility—real or theoretical—that the information might be used to reduce
risks.” 90 Alluding to possible reduced health risks in wellness programs is “one
step removed” from insurance underwriting, which involves actuarial models
and setting premiums based on calculations of health risk. 91 The EEOC

of this part applicable to health insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans do not apply to
wellness programs, even if such plans are part of a covered entity’s health plan.”).
82. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1222; Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d at 944; Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F.
Supp. 3d at 992.
83. EEOC v. Flambeau Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 855 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941,
941 (7th Cir. 2017).
84. Id. at 852.
85. Id. at 853.
86. Id. at 853–54.
87. Id. at 856.
88. Flambeau Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
89. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,131
(proposed May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
90. Id.
91. Blue, supra note 13, at 379.
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considered itself free to clarify its interpretive guidance on the issue because
neither Seff nor Flambeau held the statutory language ambiguous. 92
The next court battleground was in the Seventh Circuit and was the first case
on the ADA and wellness programs to be decided at the district level after the
EEOC issued the final rule. In September 2016, summary judgment was denied
to an employer seeking to shield its wellness program from the ADA under the
safe harbor provision in EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc. 93 The court’s
rationale, however, was not wholly aligned with that of the EEOC. Thus,
questions remain regarding future litigation on the issue. In the case, the
voluntary wellness program presented the worker with the choice to undergo the
HRA and have the employer fully cover her premium, or to not undergo the
HRA and pay 100% of her premium. 94 In contrast to the criticism of this kind of
“voluntary” wellness program by the CCD and DREDF in their comments to the
proposed rule, the court held this choice to be voluntary—even if it was “a hard
choice.” 95 The court nonetheless applied the EEOC’s clarification in the final
rule regarding the inapplicability of the safe harbor provision. 96 The court
provided the rationale that because the health plan was available separately from
the wellness program, it was not a term of that plan. 97 The plan was available
whether or not the worker opted out of the HRA, albeit at full cost. 98 Therefore,
the court reasoned the wellness program was not used in such a way that the
insurance safe harbor would apply. 99 Notably, the court did not set its ruling
contrary to the decision in Flambeau. 100 The court distinguished Orion from
Flambeau, where the wellness program was a condition precedent for the worker
to be on the employer insurance plan. 101 By distinguishing rather than ruling
differently based on the EEOC’s newly issued final rule, the court left the door
open to future legal disagreement on insurance plan terms and the applicability
of the insurance safe harbor to employer wellness plans.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Proposal for a Zero-Incentive Rule

The previous section provided a background of research, public
commentary, and judicial perspectives on wellness programs and ADA
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,131.
EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 992 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 999.
Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id. at 999.
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compliance. This section recommends the EEOC amend its definition of
“voluntary” in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) to implement a zero-incentive rule
for wellness programs that require disability-related inquiries or medical
examinations. For those types of wellness programs, under this rule, the EEOC
should remove the problematic thirty percent incentive limit in favor of
disallowing any financial incentives or penalties. This straightforward approach
recaptures the EEOC’s well-defined, pre-final rule policy on what constitutes a
“voluntary” program, does not produce significantly inconsistent results with the
ACA and HIPAA for the vast majority of programs, and demonstrates the
agency’s accountability to the ADA’s goal of protecting individuals from
discrimination on the basis of disability.
B.

Application of the Final Rule and Proposed Zero-Incentive Rule in
Litigation

Even before adopting the thirty percent limit, the EEOC has pursued
litigation of employer wellness programs having incentives or penalties
significantly higher than thirty percent, such as complete coverage or denial of
coverage. In 2014, however, the Chicago EEOC office departed from that trend
by filing a case against an employer for a program that presented a closer
issue. 102 In that case, EEOC v. Honeywell International Inc., the employer’s
wellness program offered employees a participatory incentive of a $1500
employer contribution to employees’ health savings accounts as well as imposed
non-participatory penalties of $500 and $1000 for health plan and tobacco
surcharges, respectively. 103 The Chicago EEOC argued that Honeywell’s
incentives and penalties were too large for the wellness program to be considered
voluntary under the ADA. 104 Although the local EEOC offices independently
pursue litigation matters, the EEOC as a whole received a great deal of attention
for the Honeywell suit, much of it negative from employers, and pressure was
placed on the EEOC to clarify its position on incentive-based wellness
programs. 105 The Honeywell court likewise noted, “Recent lawsuits filed by the
EEOC highlight the tension between the ACA and the ADA and signal the
necessity for clarity in the law so that corporations are able to design lawful
wellness programs and also to ensure that employees are aware of their rights
under the law.” 106

102. Madison, supra note 9, at 428.
103. Id.
104. EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., Civil No. 14-4517 ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 5795481, at *5
(D. Minn. 2014).
105. Blue, supra note 24.
106. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 2014 WL 5795481, at *5.
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1. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc.
Applying the EEOC final rule to the facts in EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., where
participation in the wellness program was required in order to be on the
employer’s health plan and the incentive was as high as seventy-five percent, 107
the district court case was wrongly decided. Flambeau’s wellness program did
not meet either the old or revised criteria for voluntary wellness programs to
qualify as an exception to the ADA’s prohibition against a covered entity from
requiring a medical examination unless shown to be job-related and consistent
with “business necessity” under § 102(d)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 108
Under the final rule, the program cannot be voluntary if participation is
required in order to be on the employer’s health plan. 109 When required for
enrollment, a wellness program cannot be considered voluntary “even if
[employees] could get [a health plan] elsewhere,” such as in the federal health
care Marketplace. 110 In this case, employees were required to complete an HRA
and biometric screenings in order to enroll in the employer’s health plan. 111
Therefore, the wellness program was a condition precedent for the employee to
be on the employer’s insurance plan. 112 Because the court wrongly applied the
safe harbor provision, the court did not analyze whether the HRA and biometric
testing were “actually ‘required’ in the manner prohibited by §
12112(d)(4)(A).” 113 The facts, however, showed that enrollment in the
employer’s health plan was denied to employees who did not participate in the
wellness program; the plan of the employee, in this case, was in fact canceled
when he was unable to complete the HRA and biometric screenings demanded
by the wellness program. 114 The employee could only reinstate coverage through
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), paying the
entire premium cost and more. 115 This suggests the plain meaning of “required”
applies when failure to meet the requirement results in the employee being
dropped from the employer’s health plan. Furthermore, the clarification in the
107. Complaint at 1, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp.
3d 849 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (No. 3:14-cv-00638), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2017).
108. Id.
109. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(ii) (2016) (a voluntary program “[d]oes not deny
coverage under any of its group health plans or particular benefits packages within a group health
plan for non-participation”).
110. Oral Argument at 12:08, EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 161402), www.courtlistener.com/audio/24860/eeoc-v-flambeau-incorporated/ (last visited July 10,
2017).
111. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 852 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941
(7th Cir. 2017).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 851.
114. Complaint, supra note 107, at 4.
115. Id.
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final rule about the definition of “voluntary” bolsters this interpretation for why
the wellness program violated § 102(d)(4)(A) of the ADA.
The financial incentive and penalty structure of Flambeau’s wellness
program was not voluntary under the final rule. Under the final rule, employers
may not set incentives or penalties exceeding thirty percent of self-only coverage
for wellness program participation. 116 As an incentive, Flambeau offered to pay
seventy-five percent of an employee’s health insurance premium in exchange
for participation in the wellness program, which had mandatory HRAs and
biometric screenings. 117 Thus, the EEOC explained, “If [the employee] had been
able to complete Flambeau’s so-called ‘voluntary’ biometric testing and health
risk assessment, Flambeau would have covered roughly three fourths of [his]
health insurance premiums.” 118 Because seventy-five percent exceeds the thirtypercent limit, the program would not be voluntary under the final rule. The
EEOC further argued that an employee resorting to paying full premiums
through COBRA as a direct result of failing to complete the wellness program
requirements constituted a penalty. 119 Arguably, even if the incentive had been
thirty percent, the program structure would still not have satisfied the final rule
because it imposed a penalty of 100% of the total cost of self-only coverage,
given that the final rule specifically applies to incentives “whether in the form
of a reward or penalty,” 120 since those are really “two sides of the same coin.” 121
An acceptable penalty under the final rule, hypothetically, may have been asking
employees not participating in the wellness program to pay up to seventy percent
of their premiums, which on the flipside provides a thirty percent incentive to
those choosing to participate in the wellness program. On the other hand, that
would still depend on allowing employees to enroll at a higher price rather than
denying them enrollment in the plan at all, as was the case here where the
employee turned to COBRA to cover the gap in coverage. During oral argument
in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, EEOC attorney Anne Noel Occhialino
explained, taking into account the final rule, “I don’t think that this case raises
. . . [the issue of] whether that thirty percent limit is permissible or not
permissible, because Flambeau’s wellness plan flunks the voluntary test even
116. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3)(i) (2016) (“The use of incentives . . . whether in the
form of a reward or penalty . . . [may] not exceed [t]hirty percent of the total cost of self-only
coverage . . . .”).
117. Complaint, supra note 107, at 4.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3); Michelle R. Seares, Note, Wellness at Work: Reconciling the
Affordable Care Act with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 218, 236–
37 (2016) (“Flambeau would have covered 75% of the premium for participating employees,
whereas nonparticipating employees were charged a penalty and forced to cover their entire
premium costs.”).
121. Mariner, supra note 5, at 328.
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without that.” 122 Putting together Flambeau’s wellness program’s seventy-five
percent incentive, 100% penalty, and involuntary participation requirement for
plan enrollment, its wellness program violated the ADA under the final rule.
Likewise, under the proposed zero-incentive rule, the wellness program was
not voluntary because it offered a seventy-five percent incentive. Under the
particular facts of this case, even if the incentive was revised to the final rule
limit of thirty percent, there would be no conflict between the outcomes of the
final rule and the zero-incentive rule. Flambeau’s wellness program was a
condition precedent for accessing the employer-sponsored health plan, which
rendered it involuntary under both the final rule and the zero-incentive rule.
Applying the final rule, the insurance safe harbor provision did not apply to
Flambeau’s wellness program such that it would be permitted to violate §
102(d)(4)(A) of the ADA. The final rule explicitly states that the safe harbor
provision does not apply to wellness programs, even those that are tied to a
health plan. 123 While the district court applied the safe harbor provision, noting
the final rule had not yet been issued, 124 at oral argument on appeal, the EEOC
referred to the recently promulgated final rule and asserted Flambeau was not
“engaging in underwriting risk, classifying risk, or administering risk[;]”
therefore the wellness program was not a valid application of the safe harbor
provision. 125 Giving deference to the unambiguous language of the ADA and
the EEOC’s final rule, a court should not apply the safe harbor provision to
Flambeau’s wellness program.
The Seventh Circuit did not ultimately reach the merits of the appeal on
whether the program was voluntary or whether the safe harbor applied, because
jurisdictional standing problems were raised during oral argument with respect
to the wellness program being discontinued and the potential lack of damages
given that the employee regained coverage. 126 Although Judge David Hamilton
described the case as “much ado about ancient history,” 127 the EEOC argued
that, absent a declaratory judgment, Flambeau could reinstitute the wellness
program. 128 The court rejected this argument, finding Flambeau had
discontinued the mandatory biometric testing and HRA for its wellness program

122. Oral Argument, supra note 110, at 10:40.
123. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (“The ‘safe harbor’ provisions in § 1630.16(f) of this part
applicable to health insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans do not apply to wellness
programs, even if such plans are part of a covered entity’s health plan.”).
124. EEOC v. Flambeau Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854, 856 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d
941, 941 (7th Cir. 2017).
125. Oral Argument, supra note 110, at 13:16.
126. Id. at 4:22–5:07.
127. Id. at 6:09.
128. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941, 949 (7th Cir. 2017) (arguing that the “voluntary
cessation exception to mootness” should apply).
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because it was not cost effective, a rationale outside the lawsuit, rendering the
EEOC’s claim for injunctive relief moot. 129
Although jurisdictional issues stymied this case, losing the chance to set a
judicial precedent for the EEOC’s wellness program guidelines, an important
lesson nonetheless emerges from the fact that the employer ultimately
terminated the wellness program. Other employers can take heed of the facts of
this case and the EEOC’s concerns for designing better, ADA-compliant
programs.
2. EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc.
A review under the final rule would reverse the holding that the wellness
program was “voluntary” under the ADA in EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems,
Inc. 130 The Seventh Circuit decision from September 2016 denied summary
judgment to an employer, ruling favorably for the EEOC that the safe harbor
provision did not apply but ruling favorably for the employer on the issue of
whether the program was “voluntary” under § 12112(d)(4)(B). 131 In Orion’s
wellness program, Orion provided an incentive of 100% coverage of
participating employees’ premiums, while “[e]mployees who declined to
participate were required to pay their entire premium cost and were charged an
additional $50 per month for failure to complete a fitness component of the
company’s wellness program.” 132 The employee in the case who did not
participate in the wellness program paid the full premium of $413.43 per month
plus a penalty of $50 per month, totaling to $463.43 per month. 133 The potential
penalties were threefold, with the third being an $80 penalty for smoking. 134
Thus, an employee opting out of the wellness program “exercising her right to
be free from disability-related medical inquiries and examinations” 135 could
potentially be responsible for $5561.16 annually in health plan costs compared
to an opt-in employee paying $0 for the same coverage. Even though the two
add-on penalties of $130 per month almost make the threshold cut of thirty
percent ($124 per month of the $413.43 monthly premium), the combination of
the penalties with the choice between zero employee contribution and complete
employee contribution does not satisfy the EEOC’s definition of voluntary. As

129. Id.
130. EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 995 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
131. Id. at 995, 1002.
132. Seares, supra note 120, at 236.
133. Complaint at 4–5, EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989 (E.D. Wis. 2016)
(No. 1:14-cv-1019).
134. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 992.
135. Seares, supra note 120, at 246.
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in Flambeau and Honeywell, such “aggressive programs” 136 exceeding the thirty
percent incentive limits are outside the scope of “voluntary” in the final rule. 137
Under the proposed zero-incentive rule, just as for the final rule, the 100%
incentive would make the wellness program in Orion involuntary and therefore
impermissible. Even if the incentive was reduced to the thirty percent limit
allowed for in the final rule, the additional financial penalties—$50 per month
for failure to perform the fitness component and $80 per month for failure to quit
smoking—would violate the zero-incentive rule.
Furthermore, even if the monthly penalties were reduced to $124 per month
(that is, thirty percent of the monthly premium of $413.43), an employee who
chose not to participate would still potentially owe $1488 in penalties annually.
For the facts in Orion, an annual penalty of $1488 would be permissible under
the final rule because it does not exceed the limit of thirty percent of the total
cost of self-only coverage. Contrastingly, under the proposed zero-incentive
rule, an employer would not be able to charge an employee $1488 annually for
declining to participate in a “voluntary” program requiring a medical
examination and disability-related inquiries.
Whether such an amount in financial penalties is sufficiently burdensome as
to justify calling a program involuntary has been questioned. For example,
Madison considered the effect of a hypothetical $500 reward on employees who
were asked to weigh the costs and benefits of participating in a program
requiring disability-related inquiries and medical examinations. 138 She posited
that it was unlikely $500 would blind employees to potential risks. 139 Madison
concluded that neither the ACA regulation of thirty percent incentive limits nor
a prohibition on incentives was a perfect fit, and instead she “stake[d] out a
middle ground . . . [for] how to implement an incentive ceiling that would help
to ensure . . . voluntariness.” 140 However, the least ambiguous way to ensure that
a financial incentive does not cause workers to subject themselves to potential
discrimination is through a zero-incentive rule. One problem with trying to
articulate a permissible incentive limit—aside from the fundamental
disagreement over whether any incentive should be permitted—is that health
insurance costs are not stagnant. As health insurance costs continue to rise—
when considering not just premiums but increasingly high deductibles, without
equitable gains in income—the amount of money represented by thirty percent
of self-only coverage becomes larger and larger, thus becoming more and more
burdensome. According to the KFF 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey,

136. Id. at 241.
137. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3)(i)–(iv) (2016).
138. Madison, supra note 9, at 441.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 455–56.
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workers earnings increased 2.5%, inflation increased 1.1%, and self-only
premium costs showed no significant increase; however, deductibles ballooned
for workers, increasing 12% since 2015 and nearly 50% since 2011. 141 As KFF
President and Chief Executive Officer Drew Altman explained, the lower
premiums reflect a tradeoff in rapidly rising deductible costs. 142 Given that
deductibles continue to rise without matched gains in income, the dollar amount
represented by a thirty percent incentive ceiling tied solely to premiums is an
unreliable figure on which to base legislative policy. Perhaps thirty percent is
reasonable this year, 143 but its reasonableness is less certain in five years, ten
years, and beyond. A zero-incentive policy offers a solution that leaves no room
for ambiguity when it comes to evaluating at what point an employee’s choice
becomes involuntary due to financial incentives or penalties. Moreover, like the
final rule, the proposed zero-incentive rule is not a blanket prohibition against
all financial incentives tied to wellness programs. Rather, like the final rule, it
carves out a subset of programs—namely, those wellness programs that require
disability-related inquiries or medical examinations. 144 This advantage of the
zero-incentive rule compared to the thirty percent rule is further expanded on in
the next section.
3. AARP v. EEOC
When evaluating the performance of the final rule at harmonizing the
regulatory scheme and balancing the policy agendas of different individuals and
national organizations, the fact that the EEOC was sued over the final rule speaks
simply and sharply to its shortfalls. Three months before the final rule was to
take effect, AARP sought a preliminary injunction and filed a complaint against
the EEOC challenging the reworked definition of “voluntary.” 145 While the

141. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Average Annual Workplace Family Health Premiums Rise
Modest 3% to $18,142 in 2016; More Workers Enroll in High-Deductible Plans with Savings
Option over Past Two Years, KFF.ORG (Sept. 14, 2016), www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/
average-annual-workplace-family-health-premiums-rise-modest-3-to-18142-in-2016-more-work
ers-enroll-in-high-deductible-plans-with-savings-option-over-past-two-years/ (last visited July 10,
2017).
142. Id.
143. 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,133 (proposed May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630). Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. (the EEOC finding
that “although substantial, the Commission concludes that, given current insurance rates, offering
an incentive of up to 30 percent of the total cost of self-only coverage does not, without more,
render a wellness program coercive”).
144. Id. at 31,141 (noting “programs that qualify as health-contingent programs (such as an
activity-based program that requires employees to exercise or walk) and that are part of a group
health plan are subject to HIPAA incentive limits” but not ADA limits set in § 1630.14(d)(3)).
145. Complaint at 22, AARP v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 2016
WL 764635 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-cv-2113) (also challenging the final rule for GINA on similar
grounds).
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court found AARP would be unlikely to succeed on the merits to strike down
the final rule as unlawful, 146 the case demonstrates the high level of
dissatisfaction with the EEOC’s adjustments to the ADA protections for
Americans with disabilities. The case “raises important questions about the
complex interaction of the ADA, GINA, the ACA and HIPAA that implicate the
public interest on all sides.” 147
AARP claimed that “permitting employers to penalize employees up to 30%
of premiums for refusing to submit to medical inquiries and examinations is
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law.” 148 AARP
specified the final rule is “unlawful because it is not a reasonable construction
of the statutory term in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4).” 149 The case is informative
because it concretizes the specific harms anticipated by AARP members. AARP
said its members would face increased premiums that they would be unable to
afford, and they would be “forced to disclose confidential medical information
that they would not otherwise choose to disclose.” 150 In holding that AARP had
standing to bring suit on the ADA claim, the court ruled that an increase in
premiums would constitute injury. 151 Furthermore, the court agreed that the
increase was sufficiently certain to occur because employers can and do push
the limits, thus incentives would almost certainly be raised to the thirty percent
because that is the new permissible maximum. 152 The court did not grant the
preliminary injunction, however, because it concluded that the harms of
increased premiums and disclosure of medical information were not irreparable
harms resulting from the ADA final rule. 153 The court was “sympathetic to the
fact that these new rules implicate important privacy interests” and agreed
“disclosure of confidential information in the first instance could still constitute
irreparable harm,” but reasoned that the aggregated data reporting protections in
the final rule adequately “guard against the discrimination the plaintiff fears” at
least to the point of making harm from disclosure fall short of warranting a
preliminary injunction. 154
Although challenging the final rule’s legality made a strong statement
against the EEOC, it was unsurprising that the court determined AARP was not

146. AARP v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2016 WL 7646358,
at *10 (D.D.C., 2016).
147. Id. at *12 (AARP suing the EEOC for the final rules of both the ADA and GINA).
148. Complaint, supra note 145, at 22.
149. Id.
150. AARP, 2016 WL 7646358, at *9.
151. Id. at *6.
152. Id. at *18 (noting that comments by employers and industry groups on the proposed rule
“indicat[e] that many employers intend to take advantage of the increased incentive level”).
153. Id. at *10.
154. Id. at *9–10.
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likely to succeed on the merits—albeit on a limited record. 155 The court
acknowledged that at this early stage it lacked access to the full administrative
record and predicted further judicial analysis would be needed at later stages in
the litigation. 156 The court denied the preliminary injunction AARP brought on
both its claims: (1) that the final rule’s interpretation of “voluntary” as permitting
incentives is coercive and unlawful and (2) that the EEOC did not make the final
rule through “reasoned decision-making.” 157 On the first claim, the court echoed
the Orion court’s language that “a hard choice is not the same as no choice,”
which again should not be the legal conclusion under the final rule. 158 The court
hinged part of its decision on a very narrow point, however, attending to the fact
that AARP challenged the specific thirty percent incentive level rather than any
level of incentive, 159 leaving it open whether AARP would consider a five
percent or fifteen percent incentive just as coercive as thirty percent. The court
reasoned that determining the precise level of permissible incentives “is exactly
the kind of agency determination to which the Court owes some deference.” 160
After all, as the court points out, the EEOC purposely chose thirty percent with
the goal of harmonizing the ADA with the ACA. 161 The court, therefore,
concluded that the EEOC is free to define “voluntary” however it wants, given
that it was undefined in the original statute. 162
More palatable is the court’s holding on the second claim regarding whether
AARP adequately explained its decision to change the “voluntary” guidelines.
The court found that the “EEOC recognized that it was changing its position . . .
but concluded that permitting the use of certain incentives . . . is ‘the best way’
to promote the ADA’s and GINA’s goal of preventing employment
discrimination while at the same time effectuating the purpose of the wellness
provisions.” 163 The explanation may exist, but whether the explanation is
satisfying is another matter. AARP’s judicial challenge puts a spotlight on the
final rule and previews potential future legal battles that will be fought against
the EEOC’s perceived shift from a maximum to a modicum of protections under
the ADA.
Turning to the proposed zero-incentive rule, a weakness in AARP’s
argument that is not shared by the zero-incentive approach is the ineffectiveness
of arguing against a specific limit rather than arguing against all incentives. 164

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

AARP, 2016 WL 7646358, at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *4, *12.
Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
AARP, 2016 WL 7646358, at *11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court explained that setting levels of incentives is “exactly” the type of
agency decision to which a court gives deference, 165 leaving open the possibility
that framing the EEOC’s final rule criteria for “voluntary” as fundamentally
wrong, rather than as a poorly chosen level, would be more likely to succeed in
meeting the arbitrary and capricious standard. Regarding that deference to
agency decisions, however, the court may have given the EEOC too much
deference given its justification for the change being a compromise to create
harmony with HIPAA and the ACA. 166
Specifically, while deliberate joint-agency coordination may warrant
judicial deference “as a signal to courts about how important an agency regards
the issue, giving judges some confidence that decision makers have closely
examined the evidence and relevant statutory factors,” 167 the thirty percent
incentive limit for voluntariness in the final rule was not necessarily the result
of a deliberate process of coordination among multiple agencies but rather a
single agency yielding to other agencies. 168 An “extensive” and “unified” effort
between agencies that “reflects a careful consideration of multiple agency
perspectives,” may be due deference for “a policy choice that harmonizes
potential inconsistencies.” 169 However, that deference should not
incontrovertibly extend here where a unilateral decision for a thirty percent
incentive was acceded to by the EEOC, without the EEOC necessarily
conducting its own rigorous analysis within the framework of the ADA. AARP
alleged in its complaint that “[t]he EEOC did not base the 30% penalty/incentive
limit on any facts in the record, any economic analysis, or any other legal
requirement.” 170 The court acknowledged its decision was the product of an
incomplete record, yet nonetheless deemed the EEOC’s compromise
explanation as “reasoned decision-making.” 171 Merely adopting another
agency’s decision—one which reverses its previous policy—should not be
sufficient to survive a challenge under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
Indeed, “the mere achievement of consensus among agencies should [not]
substitute for other evidence of a decision’s reasonableness and the agencies’

165. AARP, 2016 WL 7646358, at *11.
166. Id.
167. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1203–04 (2012) (raising the issue of “whether coordination should be factored into
arbitrary and capricious review of agency policy decisions and whether it should elicit greater
Chevron for deference of agency interpretations of law”).
168. See Oral Argument, supra note 110, at 10:15–10:39 (explaining in response to the question
of how the EEOC arrived at that thirty percent figure that it came from the HIPAA and the ACA,
and answering “yes, we tried to make it the same and not make it too confusing for employers”
when asked if “you just adopted it?”).
169. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 167, at 1205.
170. Complaint, supra note 145, at 23.
171. AARP, 2016 WL 7646358, at *12.
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thoroughness in considering relevant information.” 172 The AARP court did
qualify its determination by noting there remained an open statutory question
that depended on a review of the full record. 173
If the EEOC, on the other hand, adopted a zero-incentive rule, reaffirming
an existing policy approach to voluntariness based on a record of research
showing its reasonableness as a means to maintain longstanding ADA
protections, then that rule would likely be more easily upheld as reasoned
decision making given the research presented here. Additionally, the EEOC
would not be sued by AARP or the many other organizations that expressed
dissatisfaction with the thirty percent limit in the final rule.
The EEOC’s explanation has further weaknesses, which support undoing the
change to the thirty percent incentive rule in favor of adopting a zero-incentive
rule. These include compatibility with HIPAA and the ACA, as well as KFF
survey data pointing towards early resolution of remaining harmony issues. As
DREDF aptly explained, the wellness programs that require disability-related or
medical examinations comprise only a subset of wellness programs regulated by
HIPAA and the ACA, and thus may be regulated under the ADA in ways that
are not reflected in the other laws. 174 A wellness program can comply with all
three laws by complying with the incentive limits for the specific programs to
which they apply. Moreover, the KFF 2016 survey demonstrated a decline in the
number of wellness programs most likely to fall within the purview of the
proposed zero-incentive rule. 175 One explanation for the decline provided by the
studies on the effectiveness of wellness programs described in Section II may be
the failure of wellness programs to fulfill the promises of the twin goals of cost
savings and improved employee health. 176 For example, the Flambeau court
deemed the case moot when the employer said it ended the required medical
examination aspect of the program not because it was sued by the EEOC but
rather because it simply was not cost effective. 177 Therefore, one possibility is
that the very programs that may produce some inconsistencies between a zeroincentive rule and the thirty percent limits of the ACA and HIPAA may be
phased out over time, thereby resolving the issue without the need to
compromise ADA protections to conform with the Tri-Agencies’ thirty percent
incentive limits.

172. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 167, at 1205.
173. AARP, 2016 WL 7646358, at *12.
174. Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 7.
175. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 7; KFF & HRET, Survey 2014, supra note 15, at 206; KFF
& HRET, Survey 2013, supra note 15, at 200.
176. See LEWIS, supra note 31, at 139 (attributing to Linda Riddel on the Employee Benefit
News blog the commentary that “[b]esides being cheaper, programs that channel ‘intrinsic
motivation’ into actions will far outperform those relying on ‘financial motivation’ for results”).
177. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941, 945–46 (7th Cir. 2017).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Wellness programs, since their inception, have posed legal and policy
challenges to American workers with disabilities, and the ADA final rule does
not alleviate the pressure towards achieving “wellness” and does not maintain a
core protection previously upheld by the ADA—the protection against being
compelled to give employers disability-related information that could lead to
workplace discrimination. The cases discussed here were used as laboratories
for understanding the final rule and the proposed zero-incentive rule, and they
lay the groundwork for future courts to continue to wrestle with the changing
health care regulatory scheme as it pertains to wellness programs. If the number
of wellness programs have truly seen their heyday and are on the decline, as
suggested by the KFF survey, then perhaps the studies showing a lack of
effectiveness or cost savings are leading to less of the aggressive wellness
programs that the EEOC has spent time litigating. Based on the types of cases
the EEOC has pursued thus far, excluding the Chicago office’s Honeywell case,
the EEOC will likely continue to litigate cases with egregiously high incentives
and penalties, particularly programs (where they still exist) at 100% or zero
contribution for wellness program participation. Meanwhile, there will be
challenges brought against the EEOC, as with AARP, concerning privacy and
coercion. Further issues unexplored in this paper include aspects of those privacy
concerns covered by the concurrently-issued final rule for GINA. 178
This paper recommends a zero-incentive rule for voluntary wellness
programs that include disability-related inquiries or medical examinations,
replacing the thirty percent incentive limit described in § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) of
the final rule. By preventing employers from using financial incentives or
penalties to elicit participation in voluntary wellness programs, the EEOC would
set a clear, factually-supported standard for wellness programs to comply with
the ADA’s goal to shield employees from disability-based discrimination. Such
a rule would not only preserve the integrity of the EEOC’s past policy position
but also set up workers for a future in which rising health care costs could not
be cost-shifted through wellness program incentives or penalties to workers who
would be the least benefited and most burdened.
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